2017-23: Information & Warfare
A recent piece in The Conversation asks: ‘what would it take to trigger war between Russia and NATO?’ and concludes ‘just a spark’: “A crisis could be precipitated from at least three different types of events: unattributable attacks, unilateral actions by anxious allies, and military accidents. Such dangerous situations could quickly produce unintended consequences that slip Russia and the West into armed confrontation. Major cyber-attacks, such as the one that shut down Estonia’s government in 2007, could be particularly dangerous during an ongoing military exercise. Russia’s use of so-called hybrid warfare in Ukraine have fuelled NATO fears that a Russian military attack might be presaged by offensive actions against information systems, while Russian military planners now assume “information wars” will be part of the initial phase of every conflict.”
Readers who are interested/disturbed by these comments/developments
may ‘like’ to read the ‘ Handbook of Russian Information
Warfare
’ by Keir Giles, which is both riveting and shocking. Here's a small extract(from p47): it refers to a study published in an authoritative Russian military source lists "the primary methods of manipulating information used by the
mass media in the interests of information-psychological confrontation
objectives as:
● Direct lies for the purpose of disinformation both of the domestic population and foreign societies;
● Concealing critically important information;
● Burying valuable information in a mass of information dross;
● Simplification, confirmation and repetition (inculcation);
●
Terminological substitution: use of concepts and terms whose meaning is
unclear or has undergone qualitative change, which makes it harder to
form a true picture of events;
● Introducing taboos on specific forms of information or categories of news;
●
Image recognition: known politicians or celebrities can take part in
political actions to order, thus exerting influence on the world view of
their followers;
● Providing negative information, which is more readily accepted by the audience than positive.”
The Handbook concludes with the following chilling observation: “in information warfare, there are no rear areas. According to Russian (Chief of the General Staff) Valeriy Gerasimov, a key feature of modern warfare is 'simultaneous effects to the entire depth of enemy territory, in all physical media and in the information domain.' If and when information warfare with Russia moves to an overt phase, it is not just NATO servicemen that will be the targets; but their families, their communities, their societies and their homelands, no matter how safely far away from Russia they may presently consider themselves to be.”










